Ecology and the evolution of cooperation by partner choice and reciprocity

Organisms help each other to get resources, protection from enemies, and other goods, but not as much as would be best for their population. Partner choice, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity foster cooperation and help to align individual interests with the social good. However, we still do not know what ecological variables affect their success and interaction. I simulated the evolution of partner choice, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity, and the production of a good that partners donate to each other. I show that, with few exceptions, partner choice evolves whenever there is an initial social dilemma, under a wider range of conditions than direct reciprocity. Direct reciprocity is deleterious when the shared good is highly essential or very influential. Both partner choice and direct reciprocity compel individuals to produce close to the socially optimal quantity of the shared good. Direct reciprocity does so even when it is deleterious and reciprocators are rare. Indirect reciprocity succeeds when individuals can also choose partners, and in most cases contributes less than partner choice or direct reciprocity to alleviating social dilemmas. Partner choice may have allowed humans to use a set of collectively produced goods including clothing, fire, hunting tools, housing, and shared knowledge, to the point that they became essential.

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Publication Details

Journal
Scientific Reports
Published
2025-02-07
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-87984-8
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
8.40

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article

Ecology and the evolution of cooperation by partner choice and reciprocity

Marcelino Fuentes
2 citations
Scientific Reports
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
8.40
article

Ecology and the evolution of cooperation by partner choice and reciprocity

Marcelino Fuentes
article en
2 citations

Abstract

Organisms help each other to get resources, protection from enemies, and other goods, but not as much as would be best for their population. Partner choice, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity foster cooperation and help to align individual interests with the social good. However, we still do not know what ecological variables affect their success and interaction. I simulated the evolution of partner choice, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity, and the production of a good that partners donate to each other. I show that, with few exceptions, partner choice evolves whenever there is an initial social dilemma, under a wider range of conditions than direct reciprocity. Direct reciprocity is deleterious when the shared good is highly essential or very influential. Both partner choice and direct reciprocity compel individuals to produce close to the socially optimal quantity of the shared good. Direct reciprocity does so even when it is deleterious and reciprocators are rare. Indirect reciprocity succeeds when individuals can also choose partners, and in most cases contributes less than partner choice or direct reciprocity to alleviating social dilemmas. Partner choice may have allowed humans to use a set of collectively produced goods including clothing, fire, hunting tools, housing, and shared knowledge, to the point that they became essential.

Scientific ReportsVol. 15(1)
Universidade da Coruña (ES)
Xunta de Galicia, Universidade da Coruña
Partnerships for the goals
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
8.40
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