Audit committee tenure, financial reporting quality, and auditor independence

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of audit committee (AC) tenure on corporate governance, a topic that has been long debated. Social capital theory explains how directors’ effectiveness varies through tenure. Consistent with this theory, this paper argues that AC tenure has an inverted U-shaped relationship with AC governance. Design/methodology/approach This paper estimates a quadratic function that regresses constructs for AC governance on the average AC, the AC chair, and nonchair tenure, and their respective square terms. The constructs for AC governance include financial reporting quality measures and perceived auditor independence measures. Findings This paper finds that average AC, AC chair, and nonchair tenure have inverted U-shaped relationships with financial reporting quality, consistent with social capital theory. This paper also finds similar associations when examining perceived auditor independence. The results are generally consistent with AC directors accumulating knowledge and social capital, which improves AC governance to an optimal level, following which entrenchment and familiarity occur and AC governance declines. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study in AC governance literature to show a nonlinear relationship between AC tenure and AC governance. This paper extends Huang and Hilary (2018) by demonstrating that a nonlinear effect is also present in the AC, a key board committee responsible for monitoring financial reporting quality and appointing auditors and approving their services. This paper further documents that the AC subsumes the effect of the overall board in some areas of AC oversight, and reconciles the inconclusive findings of prior research by showing a nonlinear relationship between AC tenure and AC governance.