Kant antropológiai fordulatának egy messze ható etikai hozadéka: szubjektív és objektív gyakorlati filozófia megkülönböztetése 1763 és 1765 között

At the beginning of the Critique of Practical Reason, in the first paragraph of the Analytics, Kant makes a fundamental distinction between maxim and law. He calls the subjective practical principles maxims, whereas the objective practical principles are called laws. On closer inspection, however, this apparently easy-to-understand juxtaposition hides an ambiguity that is fundamental to critical ethics and dates back 25 years. In my study, I will briefly describe this ambiguity, and then return to the first appearance of the distinction in texts written between 1763 and 1765. By analysing the various occurrences of the differentiation, I will try to provide an overview of this extremely dense period in Kant’s philosophical development, which is usually called the anthropological turn, and in which Kant was deeply influenced by the British moral philosophers and Rousseau. I hope that by exploring the development of the Kantian distinction in the pre-critical moral philosophy, we will also gain a deeper understanding of the root of the ambiguity in the critical ethics.