THE GENERAL SOLUTION OF THE ENGLISH AUCTION WITH CONTINUOUS EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF ORDERS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF STRUCTURAL DESIGN THEORY / ԿԱՐԳԵՐԻ ԱՆԸՆԴՀԱՏ ՀԱՎԱՍԱՐԱՉԱՓ ԲԱՇԽՄԱՄԲ ԱՆԳԼԻԱԿԱՆ ԱՃՈՒՐԴԻ ԸՆԴՀԱՆՈՒՐ ԼՈՒԾՈՒՄԸ ԿԱՌՈՒՑԱԿԱՐԳԵՐԻ ՆԱԽԱԳԾՄԱՆ ՏԵՍՈՒԹՅԱՆ

In the article, the English auction was analyzed within the framework of the theory of structure design and under conditions of continuous distribution of types. The English auction is conducted by gradually increasing the initial announced price. The transaction is considered completed when only one buyer remains. The English auction consisting of N individuals was considered in the article, deriving the general solution of the auction. The dominant strategies of the auction, the state of equilibrium, the social choice function implemented by the mechanism were evaluated. In order to truthfully implement the social choice function of the auction, an appropriate mechanism has been designed. The variables of agent’s winning probability, expected utility and seller's expected return were also evaluated. The effect of increasing the number of agents on different variables of the model was evaluated: announced prices, dominant strategies, expected utility, expected revenue of the seller. As a result of the analysis, it was found that the second-price sealed bid auction and the English auction can be considered strategically the same game. As a result of the analysis, recommendations were made, as a result of the application of which and the demonstration of a scientific approach, it is possible to predict the results of the English auction in the case of N number of participants.