Locking in democracy? Transitions, returning autocratic elites, and human rights treaty commitment

Abstract Under what conditions are new democracies more committed to human rights? Existing explanations focus on the logic of the democratic lock-in as elites in new democracies commit their countries to international human rights treaties and organizations to safeguard against future nondemocratic threats. However, this proposition receives mixed empirical support within the literature, and suffers of endogeneity as it treats all democratization episodes as equivalent. Building on insights from the democratization literature, this paper develops a novel theoretical framework that provides a more direct explanation on the conditions under which political elites in new democracies are more likely to commit to human rights treaties. Using a new measure of returning autocratic elites and an instrumental variable design, the results show that democratic cabinets with a higher share of former autocratic elites are less committed to the international human rights regime. These results have implications for democratic consolidation and human rights compliance.