Can vertical interlocks of executives block adverse loops between R&D investment and the cost of equity capital? Evidence from China

Purpose This paper aims to conduct research on the role of vertical interlocks of executives in blocking adverse loops between research and development (R&D) investment and the cost of equity capital and explore the action path of vertical interlocks of executives. This paper also analyzes the differences in the effect of vertical interlocks of chairman, vertical interlocks of chief executive officer (CEO) and vertical interlocks of CEO duality. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses 28,078 firm-year samples from Chinese A-share listed companies to study the impact of R&D investment on the cost of equity capital using univariate group analysis and multiple regression methods. This paper analyzes the role of vertical interlocks of executives in reducing the positive impact of R&D investment on the cost of equity capital by constructing interaction variables, by using group testing method to analyze the differences in the vertical interlocks of executives. This study also uses propensity score matching and instrumental variables to conduct robustness tests. Findings The vertical interlocks of executives can block adverse loops between R&D investment and the cost of equity capital. The role of executive vertical interlocks is more prominent in non-state-owned firms, mainly exerting the resource effect that supports the innovation of non-state-owned firms, including the information resource effect and the financial resource effect. Through heterogeneity analysis, this paper discovered that the role of vertical interlocks of chairman is greater than that of the CEO and the CEO duality. Originality/value Based on the perspective of the correlation effect generated by vertical interlocks of executives, this paper analyzes the path of promoting corporate innovation. This provides new empirical evidence for studying the collaborative governance effect of vertical interlocks of executives “supervision effect, financial resource effect and information resource effect.” This study provides useful insights for regulatory authorities to regulate and guide development of the vertical interlocks of executives.