Non-Idealised Virtue Epistemology as Particularist Virtue Theory

Is traditional virtue epistemology a kind of idealised epistemology? Is that a bad thing? Some supporters of the virtue epistemology of liberatory virtues seem to answer these questions affirmatively. H. Battaly also argues that to avoid idealization virtue epistemologists should adopt a kind of normative contextualism according to which one and the same character trait is a virtue in some contexts, and a vice (or at least not a virtue) in other contexts. In this paper, I defend traditional virtue epistemology against some, but not all, of these charges. I argue that the examples that motivate its critics are best explained by invoking particularism about actions rather than normative contextualism about character traits. I also show that a particularist virtue epistemology of inquiry provides an account of the difference that social circumstances and power relations make to epistemically virtuous (and vicious) conduct that is superior to those that can be offered by resorting to normative contextualism.