Board Structure and Executive Compensation for R&D Spending in Innovative Companies Amid COVID-19

Innovation has played a vital role in continuing business operations worldwide amid the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. Innovation is critical for the success and survival of global organizations. Due to the risky long-term nature of innovation, executives with decision-making power may act cynically. Such pessimistic actions become normal when executive compensation is based on the firm’s short-term outcomes. Therefore, the current research examines the effect of executive compensation on research and development (R&D) investment using data from the world’s top 48 innovative companies in Australia. The proposed model was tested using Smart-PLS (v.3.2.8). The findings indicate that board composition significantly and positively affects R&D investment. Likewise, the long-term composition of executives has a positive effect, whereas short-term executive compensation has a negative effect on R&D. Hence, this research suggests that to increase innovation, firms should control the myopic actions of top management by orientating their compensation toward long-term innovation.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Journal of risk and financial management
Published
2025-02-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020069
Citations
3
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
11.73
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Board Structure and Executive Compensation for R&D Spending in Innovative Companies Amid COVID-19

Muhammad Abrar ul haq
3 citations
Journal of risk and financial management
Corporate Finance and Governance
11.73
article

Board Structure and Executive Compensation for R&D Spending in Innovative Companies Amid COVID-19

Muhammad Abrar ul haq
article en
3 citations

Abstract

Innovation has played a vital role in continuing business operations worldwide amid the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. Innovation is critical for the success and survival of global organizations. Due to the risky long-term nature of innovation, executives with decision-making power may act cynically. Such pessimistic actions become normal when executive compensation is based on the firm’s short-term outcomes. Therefore, the current research examines the effect of executive compensation on research and development (R&D) investment using data from the world’s top 48 innovative companies in Australia. The proposed model was tested using Smart-PLS (v.3.2.8). The findings indicate that board composition significantly and positively affects R&D investment. Likewise, the long-term composition of executives has a positive effect, whereas short-term executive compensation has a negative effect on R&D. Hence, this research suggests that to increase innovation, firms should control the myopic actions of top management by orientating their compensation toward long-term innovation.

Journal of risk and financial managementVol. 18(2)
University of Bahrain (BH)
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Corporate Finance and Governance
11.73
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Board Structure and Executive Compensation for R&D Spending in Innovative Companies Amid COVID-19 — Muhammad Abrar ul haq · Journal of risk and financial management (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS