SPE Delta Section: A Study of the Role of Oil in World War II and Its Strategic Impact

_ In August 1944, the Third Army under George Smith Patton Jr. was forced to a standstill near the German border due a shortage of fuel. In October 1942, German General Erwin Rommel was advancing through Egypt with the Middle Eastern oil fields “in sight” when he ran out of fuel near Cairo. Patton was refueled in time to resume his advance. Rommel was not refueled in time. He lost his strategic advantage, and he lost the key battle of El Alamein. In World War II (WW2), for the first time, the major armies’ frontline striking forces were completely or mostly mechanized. These armies ran on oil. Both the Allies and the Axis powers struggled at times to provide fuel to their armies, air forces, and navies, but the struggles were very different. Fig. 1 illustrates the oil production rates of various countries in 1940. The US was the dominant oil producer by far: 4,000 KBOPD (thousand BOPD), over 60% of worldwide production. The US supplied most of the fuel used by the Allied countries in WW2. The challenge was to get that fuel to war fronts in Europe, Africa, and Asia. The Axis powers had little or no production: - Germany—10 KBOPD - Italy—0 KBOPD - Japan—7 KBOPD Germany employed several strategies to secure and conserve fuel as discussed below. Japan also employed multiple strategies including taking control of the Dutch East Indies and other oil-producing countries by force. SPE Delta Section (New Orleans) Prepares for ATCE The “Oil in WW2” study was conducted to coincide with the 2024 SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition held in New Orleans. From November 2023 until July 2024, the authors led a small team that conducted the study. The study is presented in a series of 17 freestanding panels, each 3×7.5-ft, printed on front and back (Fig. 2). Blitzkreig With Horses From September 1939 to June 1940 Germany defeated 10 countries. Their method of attack was termed blitzkrieg (“lightning war”). Mechanized tank divisions supported by overwhelming tactical air power made them seem invincible. What is not as well-known is what happened behind the German lines. Tanks plowed ahead at 100 to 200 miles per day. The infantry walked 10 to 20 miles per day. And supplies, other than fuel, were delivered to the front via horse-drawn wagon at a similar speed (Fig. 3). In WW1 the German army used 1.5 million horses; in WW2 the Germans used twice as many horses. The use of horses was necessary because Germany did not have enough trucks to deliver supplies, and even if they had, they would not have had enough fuel to run them.