Economics of Cybersecurity Investment and Information Sharing: Firm Decision Making Under Policy Constraints

With an increasing number of firms in cybersecurity information-sharing platforms, the potential cyber risks become a critical challenge during the exchanging of information. How to balance economic benefits and security requirements is an important topic for both firms and the government. By developing a game-theoretic model, the firms’ optimal strategies are discussed considering their absorptive capacity for security information under different policy constrains. The results show that the value of security information, intrusion loss, the level of cybersecurity vulnerability, the negative impact coefficient of platform security information disclosure, and the absorptive capacity for security information are key factors impacting firms’ decisions. The value of security information and intrusion loss are constrained by the marginal utility of cybersecurity investment and security information sharing. Firms prefer to increase their security investment or security information sharing only if the value of security information and intrusion loss are positively related to the marginal utility of cybersecurity investment or cybersecurity information sharing. Specifically, in the case without policy constrains, the optimal strategies of n firms are discussed, and it is found that they are consistent with those of two firms and that the utility of any firm in the platform decreases as the number of firms increases.