Maximum-utility Popular Matchings with Bounded Instability
In a graph where vertices have preferences over their neighbors, a matching is called popular if it does not lose a head-to-head election against any other matching when the vertices vote between the matchings. Popular matchings can be seen as an intermediate category between stable matchings and maximum-size matchings. In this article, we aim to maximize the utility of a matching that is popular but admits only a few blocking edges. We observe that, for general graphs, finding a popular matching with at most one blocking edge is already NP -complete. For bipartite instances, we study the problem of finding a maximum-utility popular matching with a bound on the number (or, more generally, the cost) of blocking edges applying a multivariate approach. We show classical and parameterized hardness results for severely restricted instances. By contrast, we design an algorithm for instances where preferences on one side admit a master list and show that this algorithm is roughly optimal.
Authors
- Ildikó Schlotter (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0114-8280)
- Ágnes Cseh (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4991-2599)
Institutions
- Institute of Economics (HU)
- ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HU)
- University of Bayreuth (DE)
Publication Details
- Journal
- ACM Transactions on Computation Theory
- Published
- 2025-01-29
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3711843
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 3.13