Taking “Descartes's Myth” seriously: Rethinking the Rylean narrative

Abstract Social philosophy of mind and epistemology seem to be fairly recent inventions. According to a still widespread picture, early modern philosophers were constrained by an individualistic paradigm that settles epistemological and psychological explanations by considering the minds of single thinkers. This picture is mainly owing to the historiography epitomized in Gilbert Ryle's attack on dualism. However, once we look beyond this picture, we can see that at least some early modern views on the mind can be read as social approaches. Accordingly, a great part of understanding the history and philosophy of early modern social epistemology depends on understanding what the Rylean picture amounts to and how it functions. Drawing mainly on my case study of Spinoza, I shall argue that the Rylean picture needs to be both taken seriously and challenged. I will begin by considering its features as a historiographical narrative and zoom in on the conceptual connection between dualism and individualism to assess its adequacy.