Morální hazard v souvislosti s globální finanční krizí

Moral hazard played a central role in the events leading up to the global financial crisis. If somebody can enter into transaction whose possible adverse consequences he would not bear, then it is highly probable he does so. Thus, inadequate control of moral hazard often leads to excessive risk-taking. And excessive risk-taking is certainly a fundamental theme in today’s financial crisis. In my opinion, moral hazard in connection with the global financial crisis can be especially seen in two areas. First one is the process of securitization which enabled that lenders did not concern themselves with the quality of their loans. Second area is the application of the doctrine too-big-to-fail. The roots of the TBTF problem lie in expectation that government does not allow to fail any systemically important institutions. This article is trying to suggest some changes how to deal with this problem because without significant changes we might be expecting a similar or even worse crisis in the financial markets in a few years time.