Finding Safety Violations of AI-Enabled Control Systems through the Lens of Synthesized Proxy Programs

Given the increasing adoption of modern AI-enabled control systems, ensuring their safety and reliability has become a critical task in software testing. One prevalent approach to testing control systems is falsification, which aims to find an input signal that causes the control system to violate a formal safety specification using optimization algorithms. However, applying falsification to AI-enabled control systems poses two significant challenges: (1) it requires the system to execute numerous candidate test inputs, which can be time-consuming, particularly for systems with AI models that have many parameters, and (2) multiple safety requirements are typically defined as a conjunctive specification, which is difficult for existing falsification approaches to comprehensively cover. This paper introduces Synthify , a falsification framework tailored for AI-enabled control systems, i.e., control systems equipped with AI controllers. Our approach performs falsification in a two-phase process. At the start, Synthify synthesizes a program that implements one or a few linear controllers to serve as a proxy for the AI controller. This proxy program mimics the AI controller's functionality but is computationally more efficient. Then, Synthify employs the \(\epsilon\) -greedy strategy to sample a promising sub-specification from the conjunctive safety specification. It then uses a Simulated Annealing-based falsification algorithm to find violations of the sampled sub-specification for the control system. To evaluate Synthify , we compare it to PSY-TaLiRo , a state-of-the-art and industrial-strength falsification tool, on 8 publicly available control systems. On average, Synthify achieves a 83.5% higher success rate in falsification compared to PSY-TaLiRo with the same budget of falsification trials. Additionally, our method is 12.8 \(\times\) faster in finding a single safety violation than the baseline. The safety violations found by Synthify are also more diverse than those found by PSY-TaLiRo , covering 137.7% more sub-specifications.

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Publication Details

Journal
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Published
2025-01-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1145/3715105
Citations
3
Primary Topic
Formal Methods in Verification
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
4.51
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article

Finding Safety Violations of AI-Enabled Control Systems through the Lens of Synthesized Proxy Programs

Jieke Shi, Bowen Xu, Zhou Yang, DongGyun Han et al.
3 citations
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Formal Methods in Verification
4.51
article

Finding Safety Violations of AI-Enabled Control Systems through the Lens of Synthesized Proxy Programs

Jieke Shi, Bowen Xu, Zhou Yang, DongGyun Han, Dongsun Kim, David Lo, Junda He
article en
3 citations

Abstract

Given the increasing adoption of modern AI-enabled control systems, ensuring their safety and reliability has become a critical task in software testing. One prevalent approach to testing control systems is falsification, which aims to find an input signal that causes the control system to violate a formal safety specification using optimization algorithms. However, applying falsification to AI-enabled control systems poses two significant challenges: (1) it requires the system to execute numerous candidate test inputs, which can be time-consuming, particularly for systems with AI models that have many parameters, and (2) multiple safety requirements are typically defined as a conjunctive specification, which is difficult for existing falsification approaches to comprehensively cover. This paper introduces Synthify , a falsification framework tailored for AI-enabled control systems, i.e., control systems equipped with AI controllers. Our approach performs falsification in a two-phase process. At the start, Synthify synthesizes a program that implements one or a few linear controllers to serve as a proxy for the AI controller. This proxy program mimics the AI controller's functionality but is computationally more efficient. Then, Synthify employs the \(\epsilon\) -greedy strategy to sample a promising sub-specification from the conjunctive safety specification. It then uses a Simulated Annealing-based falsification algorithm to find violations of the sampled sub-specification for the control system. To evaluate Synthify , we compare it to PSY-TaLiRo , a state-of-the-art and industrial-strength falsification tool, on 8 publicly available control systems. On average, Synthify achieves a 83.5% higher success rate in falsification compared to PSY-TaLiRo with the same budget of falsification trials. Additionally, our method is 12.8 \(\times\) faster in finding a single safety violation than the baseline. The safety violations found by Synthify are also more diverse than those found by PSY-TaLiRo , covering 137.7% more sub-specifications.

ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
North Carolina State University (US), Royal Holloway University of London (GB), Korea University (KR), Singapore Management University (SG)
Openalex Percentile: Top 6%
Formal Methods in Verification
4.51
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