THE CURIOUS CASE OF CRIMINALIZABLE CORPORATE HARMS IN INDIA: THE 1991 ECONOMIC REFORMS AND THE NEOLIBERAL TURN

In this study, I argue that the rationale determining criminalisable corporate harms has undergone a radical transformation from protection of public interest to boosting ease of doing business in India. The economic reforms (reforms) of 1991 is identified as the root cause of such transformation. I argue that corporate harms were initially criminalised majorly to protect public interest in the pre-reforms era. With the new mandate of creating a market-friendly economy, the reforms transformed this rationale having public interest as its major focus, to ease of doing business. Consistent with the neoliberal framework of the reforms, the ease of doing business rationale and the consequent decriminalisation of corporate harms are justified as incentivising private participation and generating wealth, benefitting all through the trickling-down effect. However, the data on economic inequality in India post-reforms suggests that, in practice, the reforms have disproportionately benefitted a few. On this basis, I argue that the ease of doing business rationale, stemming from the reforms as an important tool to achieve its promise, inherently carries this contradiction of the reforms between its promise and actual effects. Finally, I argue that this rationale, with its focus on profits benefitting a few, is contradictory to the purpose of criminal law to benefit the interest of all.

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Publication Details

Journal
Gnlu Journal Of Law And Economics.
Published
2024-12-24
DOI
https://doi.org/10.69893/gjle.2024.000067
Primary Topic
Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

THE CURIOUS CASE OF CRIMINALIZABLE CORPORATE HARMS IN INDIA: THE 1991 ECONOMIC REFORMS AND THE NEOLIBERAL TURN

T. H. Vishnu
Gnlu Journal Of Law And Economics.
Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
article

THE CURIOUS CASE OF CRIMINALIZABLE CORPORATE HARMS IN INDIA: THE 1991 ECONOMIC REFORMS AND THE NEOLIBERAL TURN

T. H. Vishnu
article en

Abstract

In this study, I argue that the rationale determining criminalisable corporate harms has undergone a radical transformation from protection of public interest to boosting ease of doing business in India. The economic reforms (reforms) of 1991 is identified as the root cause of such transformation. I argue that corporate harms were initially criminalised majorly to protect public interest in the pre-reforms era. With the new mandate of creating a market-friendly economy, the reforms transformed this rationale having public interest as its major focus, to ease of doing business. Consistent with the neoliberal framework of the reforms, the ease of doing business rationale and the consequent decriminalisation of corporate harms are justified as incentivising private participation and generating wealth, benefitting all through the trickling-down effect. However, the data on economic inequality in India post-reforms suggests that, in practice, the reforms have disproportionately benefitted a few. On this basis, I argue that the ease of doing business rationale, stemming from the reforms as an important tool to achieve its promise, inherently carries this contradiction of the reforms between its promise and actual effects. Finally, I argue that this rationale, with its focus on profits benefitting a few, is contradictory to the purpose of criminal law to benefit the interest of all.

Gnlu Journal Of Law And Economics.Vol. VII(II)
Openalex Percentile: Top 57%
Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
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