A Critical Analysis of Anti-Defection Law Through an Economic Lens

Defection is not an unfamiliar term for parliamentary democracies like India. Though the evil practice was present since the pre-independence era, the advent of the multi-party system resulting in coalition governments increased floor crossing. The instabilities in the weak regimes followed by the political turmoil leading to the rise and fall of governments raised the demand for a law on regulating defection. Addressing popular demand, the 52nd Amendment Act of 1985 (India Const. amend. LII, 1985) was brought into the picture which added, the 10th schedule to the constitution (India Const. Sch. X). The law was drafted with due care and attention to retain political preferences and the public’s choice. This legislation provided for the disqualification of members in case of defection except for a split or a merger. Subsequently, the law was judicially challenged and judgments were interpreted, where the deterrence effect of the law is highly doubtful. This paper makes an attempt to understand the development of anti-defection law, through judicial interpretations while pointing out the drawbacks of the legislation with the help of economic analysis. To determine the efficiency of the law, economic theories like game theory and public choice theory were applied.