Worst-Case Integrity Attacks and Resilient State Estimation With Partially Secured Measurements

This article examines the problem of optimal deception attacks against state estimation with partially secured measurements, where smart sensors transmit innovation sequences to the remote end for information fusion. Due to resource limitations or defensive countermeasures, the adversary can only modify data packets transmitted through unreliable channels. Meanwhile, the attack should be synthesized with sophistication to deceive an anomaly detector. To investigate the vulnerabilities of such estimation systems without feedback links and enhance security performance, the optimal attack policy is derived by formulating and explicitly solving a convex optimization problem, with the goal of maximizing the sum of estimation errors. Subsequently, a novel attack detection and resilient state estimation algorithm is proposed to ensure an acceptable level of estimation accuracy. The theoretical performance metrics, including false alarm rates for the proposed detector, are provided. Finally, the effectiveness of the results is confirmed through numerical examples.