Reinforcement Learning-Based False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids

False data injection (FDI) attacks construct attack vectors to inject false data into tampered meters with the goal of falsifying state estimation, but resulting in low successful attack rate with high attack costs in terms of the number of tampered meters in large-scale smart grids, because the bad data detection at the control center chooses the dynamic detection thresholds to identify the modified meter measurements. In this article, we propose a reinforcement learning-based FDI attack scheme that optimizes both the tampered meters and the false data to enhance the success attack rate and injected errors while reducing attack costs. Based on meter measurements and previous performance, the attack vector is constructed to induce more errors in state estimation and bypass bad data detection. The performance bounds regarding the successful attack rate and the injected error are derived in terms of the number of bus phase angles, the susceptance of the transmission line, and the maximum false data based on the Nash equilibrium of the FDI game. Simulations performed on both the IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems demonstrate the performance gain over the benchmarks.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
Published
2025-01-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/tii.2025.3528571
Citations
13
Primary Topic
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
15.79

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Reinforcement Learning-Based False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids

Zefang Lv, Shiyu Xu, Yilin Xiao, Haoyu Chen et al.
13 citations
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
15.79
article

Reinforcement Learning-Based False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids

Zefang Lv, Shiyu Xu, Yilin Xiao, Haoyu Chen, Liang Xiao, Chuxuan Wang
article en
13 citations

Abstract

False data injection (FDI) attacks construct attack vectors to inject false data into tampered meters with the goal of falsifying state estimation, but resulting in low successful attack rate with high attack costs in terms of the number of tampered meters in large-scale smart grids, because the bad data detection at the control center chooses the dynamic detection thresholds to identify the modified meter measurements. In this article, we propose a reinforcement learning-based FDI attack scheme that optimizes both the tampered meters and the false data to enhance the success attack rate and injected errors while reducing attack costs. Based on meter measurements and previous performance, the attack vector is constructed to induce more errors in state estimation and bypass bad data detection. The performance bounds regarding the successful attack rate and the injected error are derived in terms of the number of bus phase angles, the susceptance of the transmission line, and the maximum false data based on the Nash equilibrium of the FDI game. Simulations performed on both the IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems demonstrate the performance gain over the benchmarks.

IEEE Transactions on Industrial InformaticsVol. 21(4)
Xiamen University (CN), Fudan University (CN), Peng Cheng Laboratory (CN)
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Openalex Percentile: Top 1%
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
15.79
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.