Inquiry of forms: “( )is big” and “the concept of ‘( ) is big’”

Plato’s Parmenides explores complex discussions about forms, which have puzzled scholars for many years. The topic of how items might possess similar qualities, such "bigness," is one of the main concerns. If something assumes the shape of "bigness," something else will adopt the form of smallness. But what if a lot of things share "bigness"? Nothing can have two conflicting features from an ontological standpoint, therefore why do things seem "smaller" in comparison? Using Frege's philosophical theory, this essay will examine the form of "bigness" in Parmenides and elucidate its essence. This paper will specifically differentiate between the concepts of "( )is big" and "( )'is big."It is possible for anything to be large without completely expressing "the concept of '( ) is big.'"(For example, the shape of largeness). In conclusion, this paper will demonstrate that the question of embodying “bigness” can be resolved by differentiating concepts from proper names.