The game of rental housing financialization: Institutional investors in the Swedish housing system

While attention has been paid to how politico-legal reforms have enabled or inhibited the entrance of institutional investors, less is known about how these providers impact or challenge existing actors, regulations, processes, and institutional arrangements within local housing systems. This article departs from the case of Sweden: it has been discussed how institutional investors have been enabled by the country’s soft rent regulation, which is based on a collective bargaining process between all providers and the Swedish Union of Tenants (SUT) and allows for sharp rent increases after renovation. We show how in the Swedish case large institutional investors exploit existing institutional arrangements and challenge the norms that underlie the functioning of the rental housing system. To explore and illustrate this process we rely on the theory of incremental institutional change and complement it through the conceptual metaphor of “gaming.” We argue that housing systems can be understood as playing fields in which different actors employ tactics to defend or advance their interests, without, necessarily, the need to formally change the rules of the game. We suggest that more attention should be paid to institutional investors’ active engagement with local housing systems over time, beyond dichotomies of enablement or inhibition.