Metaphysical ecumenicalism and Moore’s proof

Abstract You have hands, but does it follow that there’s an external material world? Moore thought so. However, we argue that this is a mistake. We defend the Ecumenical View, on which ordinary object terms like “hands” are metaphysically ecumenical, akin to the way that terms like “table” are physically ecumenical: just as there are wooden, metal, or plastic tables, so too there can be material, virtual, or immaterial hands. Moore’s position, however, is metaphysically sectarian: the semantics of “hands” requires a materialist metaphysics. Moore’s proof fails not because it displays bad epistemology but because of its problematic commitment to sectarian metaphysics. We conclude with some explorative thoughts on how the Ecumenical View bears on common sense epistemology and a possible equivocation in our understanding of the premises of Moore’s argument.