Fool Me Twice, Shame on Me: Security Guarantees, Commitment Problems and the Problem of Peace through Victory in Ukraine

Abstract A considerable debate focuses on whether Ukraine and its allies should pursue an end to the Russo-Ukrainian war via negotiation or by pursuing victory. By focusing on the commitment problem, this article shifts the focus by asking what kind of peace is most likely to endure. Peace agreements depend on promises about future behavior, but such commitments are often not credible, because changes in circumstances can make it irrational to honor them. Guarantees by external actors are essential to solving commitment problems, but these external guarantees encounter their own credibility problems. Is it possible to construct a set of arrangements that leaves both Ukraine and Russia supporting a post-war status quo rather than seeking to revise it? The central finding is that, while concessions to Russia are more likely to yield peace in the short term, peace through victory is more likely to endure.