Argumente privind intensificarea rolului inducerii în eroare în doctrina militară românească

The celebrated idea of Prussian war strategist Carl von Clausewitz regarding conventional warfare played a dominant role up to the First World War in the West. In his seminal work “On War”, Clausewitz posits: “If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match your efforts against the power of resistance!” In a way, his idea was akin to annihilating the enemy’s army in major battles. However, this idea was challenged by British military strategist Basil Henry Liddell Hart in his book, titled “The Strategy”, by proposing a different military theory called “Indirect Approach”. The objective of this paper is based on making a comparative analysis between Clausewitz and Liddell Hart regarding the utility of their military theories in modern warfare. While taking a methodology based on a comparative analysis of the utility of the two doctrines, this paper explores the effectiveness of those military strategies against the current asymmetries in modern warfare. To buttress the reliability of this research, the examples from the Ukrainian war and the Sri Lankan civil war between 1990 and 2009 will be examined. The main objectivity of this paper lies in creating a novel discussion on the merits and demerits of Clausewitz and Basil Liddell Hart’s theories of war in contemporary warfare. The results emerging from this research will demonstrate the relevance of re-reading both Clausewitz and Liddell Hart in an era where the orthodox idea of warfare is at stake.