Evolutionary Game Research on a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Green Behavior Decisions under Low-Carbon Constraints
This study constructs an evolutionary game model for a closed-loop supply chain, incorporating green behavior decisions under low-carbon constraints. It analyzes the revenue scenarios and evolutionary trends of suppliers, distributors, and recyclers under different strategy combinations, while also examining the stability of equilibrium points through a three-party game matrix. The findings indicate that suppliers are less motivated to adopt green production methods, primarily due to the high costs associated with these practices, and government subsidies and carbon tax mechanisms are insufficient to bridge this cost gap. The distributors’ decisions to promote green products are influenced by factors such as cost, market demand, and their relationships with suppliers. For recyclers, the incentive to actively recycle waste products is driven mainly by government subsidies and the inherent value of the recycled materials.
Authors
- Yonghui Ye
- Xiangping Wang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-7595-1698)
- Youming Ou (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-9615-9970)
Institutions
- Guangdong Polytechnic of Science and Technology (CN)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2024-10-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3708036.3708218
- Primary Topic
- Sustainable Supply Chain Management
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00