Security Protection Levels for GNSS PVT Assurance with a 5G NTN LEO Satellite

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) spoofing attacks pose severe threats to position security. As 5G terrestrial and non-terrestrial systems provide communication through authenticated links, these signals are unaffected by GNSS spoofing attacks and can assist in detecting such threats. This paper investigates a potential scenario with a user equipment (UE) connected to a 5G non-terrestrial network (NTN) satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO). The UE uses GNSS signals for positioning and verifies authenticity with ranging measurements from the LEO satellite, considered as a trusted anchor. This study aims to demonstrate two key findings: first, despite the use of a precise trusted signal, attackers can still manipulate a receiver’s position without being detected; second, it introduces a novel concept of security protection level by establishing an upper limit on the positional deviation induced by attackers.