An Inquiry into the Good. Part III, Chapters 2–7 / Translation from Japanese, Introductory Article and Commentaries by S. Kapranov

This publication presents the Ukrainian translation of chapters 2–7 of the third part of the work Zen-no Kenkyu (The Study of the Good) by Nishida Kitaro, a prominent Japanese philosopher of the 20th century, the founder of modern Japanese philosophy. The third part of the work is devoted to the concept of the good. In Chapter 2, Nishida continues to analyze behavior and the will that determines it. He criticizes the materialist approach and asserts the unity of action and will. Chapter 3 is devoted to the problem of free will. Having critically examined the arguments of determinists and voluntarists, Nishida defends the thesis that freedom is action in accordance with one’s own nature. He concludes that will is a manifestation of unifying activity, power that constitutes the foundation of reality, and therefore the will is “free and not subject to the laws of nature”. Chapter 4 is devoted to the problem of values. In it, Nishida rejects the explanation of human values through the laws of nature and other external factors. Values, in his opinion, are determined by our aspirations, and they are facts of direct experience. In the following chapters, Nishida briefly considers various ethical theories. Chapter 5 is devoted to intuitionism. Nishida criticizes it for its internal contradictions and discrepancies in the understanding of intuition. Chapter 6 examines heteronomous or authoritarian ethics. Nishida divides this trend into two types – theocratic, exemplified by Duns Scotus, and autocratic, examined using the teachings of Hobbes and Xunzi. Particular attention is paid to the views of Kirchmann. Nishida believes that authoritarian ethics deprives moral laws of meaning and is unable to provide a clear criterion for distinguishing between good and evil. Chapter 7 is devoted to one of the types of autonomous ethics, namely, rationalism. It is examined using the example of Samuel Clarke, as well as the Cynics and Stoics. Nishida concludes that although rationalism can justify the universality of moral laws, it is not in itself capable of giving them any positive meaning.