Axiological hinge commitments

Abstract In his final notebooks, published posthumously as On Certainty , Wittgenstein set forth a radical picture of the structure of rational evaluation, one that has arational hinge commitments at its heart. Much of the focus of discussion of hinge commitments has been on the commonsense, Moorean, factual commitments that fall into this class (such as that one has hands, one’s name is such-and-such, and so on). But on a plausible rendering of the Wittgensteinian position, there ought to also be hinge commitments of a broadly axiological nature, which express the subject’s fundamental values (moral, political, and so forth) that comprise her worldview. Various recent proposals for understanding axiological hinge commitments are considered, with most of them found to be problematic. A particular conception of axiological hinge commitments is offered, and their philosophical relevance is explored by considering how they relate to deep moral disagreements.