Responsibility and Guilt in Ancient Greek and Contemporary Thought

The article examines the similarities and differences between Ancient Greek and contemporary conceptions of responsibility and guilt. Through linguistic and conceptual analysis of relevant terms in Ancient Greek, Latin, and Lithuanian, the author focuses on the problem of demarcation between the meanings of responsibility and guilt, particularly in cases when the terms under analysis express both senses and often do so syncretically and simultaneously. Special attention is given to the Ancient Greek tendency to conceptualize responsibility as potential guilt, defining those responsible as positive or negative “causes” of both wrongful actions and unfortunate outcomes. The possibility of conceiving responsibility without guilt is also briefly explored in the context of both Ancient Greek and contemporary thought. It is noted that the understanding of responsibility evident in Ancient Greek language itself is significantly more conservative and traditional in comparison to more innovative interpretations found in Ancient Greek philosophical writings. This innovation is exemplified by Ancient Greek philosophers who view the care (meletē) for oneself and one’s soul essentially as a form of responsibility devoid of guilt. The article concludes that Ancient Greek conceptions of responsibility, guilt, and their interrelation – especially the Ancient Greek version of the notion of responsibility without guilt – remain relevant not only in the historical study of Classical philosophy but also in contemporary ethical discourse. This relevance extends to the analysis of the limits of ethical responsibility, the relationship between collective responsibility and guilt, as well as the urgent need for spontaneous ethical initiatives by individual ethical subjects in response to global environmental and geopolitical challenges, and the ways of encouraging and supporting such initiatives.