On concepts of action and behavior as the implicit point of agreement between Enactivism and Radical Behaviorism

In psychology, the principle of “Behaviorism” has a negative connotation. The ascription of the philosophical stance as “behaviorist” is usually nuanced with criticism, and those labeled behaviorists often deny it (For example, Gallagher says, “But then, a surprise! Barrett also wants to recruit the behaviorists, and specifically, B. F. Skinner. Is this “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” type of strategy? Can we maintain peace within our own ranks if we mix phenomenologist with behaviorists?” (Gallagher, Philosophical Studies, 176(3), 839-851, 2019 p. 841)). However, some recent re-evaluations have rescued Behaviorism by indicating that these arguments were based on a caricatured view. This study further argues a point of agreement in their fundamental concept of “behavior” and “action,” leading to a more productive relationship, in three steps. First, it starts with an overview of the development of Behaviorism. This step identifies that the concept of “behavior” in the sense of contemporary Behaviorism has interactive properties between an agent and the environment instead of mere physical movements, which can be summarized in two key features: modern Behaviorism understands behavior (1) in relation to subsequent events and (2) as inseparable from mental phenomena, which is discussed in usual cognitive science; it also understands mental phenomena as something observable in behaviors (Sect. 1). Next, we demonstrate that some of the distorted criticism of Behaviorism arises due to a lack of understanding of behavior (Sect. 2). It is revealed that the characterization as Behaviorism per se should be value-neutral once the behavior concept is accurately articulated. Finally, Sects. 3 and 4 shed light on the approach taken by enactivists in their treatment of actions, aligning them with the concept of behavior. It will be contended that these theories exhibit the presence of two characteristics previously outlined within Behaviorism.

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Publication Details

Journal
Asian Journal of Philosophy
Published
2025-01-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00232-0
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Embodied and Extended Cognition
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.43

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article

On concepts of action and behavior as the implicit point of agreement between Enactivism and Radical Behaviorism

Hiroshi Matsui, Kohei Yanagawa
1 citations
Asian Journal of Philosophy
Embodied and Extended Cognition
1.43
article

On concepts of action and behavior as the implicit point of agreement between Enactivism and Radical Behaviorism

Hiroshi Matsui, Kohei Yanagawa
article en
1 citations

Abstract

In psychology, the principle of “Behaviorism” has a negative connotation. The ascription of the philosophical stance as “behaviorist” is usually nuanced with criticism, and those labeled behaviorists often deny it (For example, Gallagher says, “But then, a surprise! Barrett also wants to recruit the behaviorists, and specifically, B. F. Skinner. Is this “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” type of strategy? Can we maintain peace within our own ranks if we mix phenomenologist with behaviorists?” (Gallagher, Philosophical Studies, 176(3), 839-851, 2019 p. 841)). However, some recent re-evaluations have rescued Behaviorism by indicating that these arguments were based on a caricatured view. This study further argues a point of agreement in their fundamental concept of “behavior” and “action,” leading to a more productive relationship, in three steps. First, it starts with an overview of the development of Behaviorism. This step identifies that the concept of “behavior” in the sense of contemporary Behaviorism has interactive properties between an agent and the environment instead of mere physical movements, which can be summarized in two key features: modern Behaviorism understands behavior (1) in relation to subsequent events and (2) as inseparable from mental phenomena, which is discussed in usual cognitive science; it also understands mental phenomena as something observable in behaviors (Sect. 1). Next, we demonstrate that some of the distorted criticism of Behaviorism arises due to a lack of understanding of behavior (Sect. 2). It is revealed that the characterization as Behaviorism per se should be value-neutral once the behavior concept is accurately articulated. Finally, Sects. 3 and 4 shed light on the approach taken by enactivists in their treatment of actions, aligning them with the concept of behavior. It will be contended that these theories exhibit the presence of two characteristics previously outlined within Behaviorism.

Asian Journal of PhilosophyVol. 4(1)
Ritsumeikan University (JP), Osaka University of Human Sciences (JP)
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
Openalex Percentile: Top 23%
Embodied and Extended Cognition
1.43
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