HBRA: A History-Based Remote Attestation Approach to Resolve Malicious Verifiers in IoT

Numerous Internet of Things (IoT) devices positively impact our lives but also present a broad attack surface. Swarm attestation is a technology designed to protect IoT devices by having a verifier ensure the integrity of devices grouped into a swarm. However, in swarm attestation, there are threats where entities such as the prover, verifier can become malicious. Among these, a malicious verifier can generate attestation results regardless of the prover's integrity, ultimately leading to trust issues in the attestation protocol. To address this, we propose HBRA. This protocol uses history to eliminate all mentioned threats. In this paper, we add a table within the prover to store old nonces used in previous attestations and introduce a new entity called the log-server to store the hash values corresponding to these old nonces. Our protocol uses these recorded values in subsequent attestations to verify the verifier, enabling mutual authentication between the prover and verifier. We created various attack scenarios to prove the protocol's effectiveness against the specified threats and demonstrated through simulation-based experiments that our protocol can overcome these scenarios. Additionally, we conducted comparative experiments on time cost with existing research, proving the superiority of our approach.