Breakthrough Solutions for Post-Quantum Security with QC-MDPC Codes

Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public-key cryptography (PKC), is an encryption method that employs two separate keys: a public key for encryption and a private key for decryption. However, PKC may be compromised by quantum computers due to their unique properties stemming from quantum mechanics. Quantum computers have an ability to crack Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) algorithms mainly due to Grover's and Shor's algorithm. Shor's algorithm is effective at factoring huge integers into their prime factors whereas Grover's algorithm is a quantum algorithm designed to search through an unsorted list of items quadratically more efficient than conventional computers. There are various post-quantum key encapsulation algorithms like NTRUEncrypt, Kyber, NewHope, FrodoKEM, Lizard and SIKE (Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation) that withstand attacks from quantum computers, but these algorithms require careful tuning of parameters, making it sensitive to key size considerations. There focus on efficiency results in a trade-off with versatility. They have a steeper learning curve for implementation, potentially leading to challenges in adoption. This paper explores BIKE, a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) based on quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes, engineered to withstand attacks from both classical and quantum computers. BIKE addresses the vulnerabilities of traditional Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) algorithms to quantum computing through its compact key sizes and efficient cryptographic operations. We present a comprehensive implementation of BIKE which can be tailored for Xilinx Kintex UltraScale FPGAs, leveraging programmable accelerators for key generation, encapsulation, and decapsulation aiming to maximize performance while supporting secure key exchange in real-world cryptographic applications.