Epistemic Paternalism: From the “Classical” to the Libertarian Version?

The subject of the research in this article is epistemic paternalism, considered from the perspective of social epistemology. The research methodology uses methods of socio-philosophical cognition (systemic, functional, informational, etc.). The article substantiates the idea that, despite the variable assessments of epistemic paternalism, it has an objective basis for existence and in one form or another is reproduced in the processes of cognition, meaning the intervention of actors in the processes of cognition of individuals without their consent, but with the aim of bringing them benefi t. However, in many cases epistemic paternalism is diffi cult to distinguish from paternalism in general. A number of conditions must be fulfi lled to distinguish epistemic paternalism from general paternalism. But even in this case it is important: who implements such an intrusion, for what purpose and to what results it leads. The variant of epistemic libertarian paternalism seems preferable, although it could not avoid drawbacks. The question is: can the choice made by an individual in the process of cognition, based on given epistemic conditions, be considered truly free, and can he himself be considered an autonomous subject of cognition? This variant of paternalism largely corresponds to the concept of ‘nudging’, in which the creation of appropriate conditions ‘pushes’ the individual to a certain choice. At the same time, the following problems remain unresolved: who has the right to carry out this ‘nudge’, how to determine the true goals of such an intrusion and prevent malicious actions on the part of interventionists, etc.