Operationalizing Package Treaties: A US Case Study

Abstract This article studies the incorporation of package treaties in domestic law and administrative practice, including the functions these treaties serve once in force. This sketch of the domestic operationalization offers a window into the institutional design choices that shape how lawmakers craft the regulatory ecosystem in which flanking policies are carried out. The typology for understanding how governments situate package treaties in their domestic regulatory spaces is introduced, arguing that the ‘package’ of legally binding trade liberalization commitments and mutually agreed flanking policies is shaped by both legislative and regulatory choices that are often underestimated and overlooked. DUS trade agreements are used as a case study, finding that the US government's treatment of each of its trade agreements tends to follow a common pattern: only a small part of the agreement is transposed into domestic law; complex and robust institutions are built around the agreement to embed it deeply into the trade policy work of the executive branch; and, the entrenchment of US trade agreements has a significant enabling effect across a wide range of cross-border regulatory engagements that US agencies think of as ‘monitoring’ or ‘enforcing’, among other labels. Finally, the policy choices against the goals laid out by proponents of package treaties are assessed.