A Domestic Political Economy of Package Treaties

Abstract The post-World War II liberal international order coupled trade liberalization with a range of flanking measures, both outward-looking and inward-looking. This system, coupling domestic-level compensation with international-level flexibility, no longer functions as effectively as it once did. To consider how a renewed set of flanking policies might address, or even prevent, a backlash against trade liberalization, we explore why the earlier system (embedded liberalism plus temporarily tolerated relief) did not always function effectively. We note the challenges associated with generous domestic compensation schemes, especially in the face of capital mobility and fiscal pressures. We discuss the interstate tensions generated by the use of temporary relief measures, such as escape clauses and safeguards, and we also discuss how the expansion in membership of the multilateral trade system (and particularly the inclusion of countries with a greater array of economic institutions and factor endowments) exacerbates these challenges. Finally, we consider how the domestic politics of flanking policies could differ from those used in an earlier era.