Democracy, Disagreement, and Authority: A Response to the Symposium on Common Good Constitutionalism

Abstract In this response to a recent symposium on Common Good Constitutionalism in the American Journal of Jurisprudence, I principally take up themes related to democracy, disagreement, pluralism, and authority. I emphasize that the classical legal tradition is teleological, oriented to performance standards rather than design standards. Thus it does not attempt to prescribe an identical set of constitutional and institutional arrangements for all polities everywhere, but asks whether constitutional arrangements are ordered to the common good and (thus) compatible with natural and divine law. Subject to those conditions, political authority is natural, inevitable, inescapable, and good. The possibility of social and political disagreement is just a precondition for all law, not an objection to the classical legal framework. None of this entails judicial supremacism in any form, which the classical legal tradition squarely rejects.