Commodifying Public Utilities: EU's New Governance Prescriptions for Rail and Water

ABSTRACT In the mid‐2000s, the Single Market Program and European Monetary Union lost momentum, as public services advocates increasingly succeeded in tempering attempts to liberalize public utilities through legislative amendments and Court of Justice rulings. After the 2008 crisis, however, the EU's shift to a new economic governance (NEG) regime provided EU executives with a new tool to advance their objectives. Unlike EU directives, country‐specific NEG prescriptions require neither the approval of the European Parliament nor their transposition into law, making it more difficult for social forces to contest them. Our analysis of NEG prescriptions for public utilities in two sectors (rail and water) and four countries (Germany, Ireland, Italy, Romania) across 10 years (2009–2019) shows that the shift to NEG provided EU executives with new extra‐parliamentarian and extra‐juridical tools that allowed them to revive their stalled commodification agenda; at the price of accentuating the EU's democratic and justice deficits.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Governance
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12909
Citations
2
Primary Topic
EU Law and Policy Analysis
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
31.97

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Commodifying Public Utilities: EU's New Governance Prescriptions for Rail and Water

Imre Szabó, Roland Erne, Darragh Golden
2 citations
Governance
EU Law and Policy Analysis
31.97
article

Commodifying Public Utilities: EU's New Governance Prescriptions for Rail and Water

Imre Szabó, Roland Erne, Darragh Golden
article en
2 citations

Abstract

ABSTRACT In the mid‐2000s, the Single Market Program and European Monetary Union lost momentum, as public services advocates increasingly succeeded in tempering attempts to liberalize public utilities through legislative amendments and Court of Justice rulings. After the 2008 crisis, however, the EU's shift to a new economic governance (NEG) regime provided EU executives with a new tool to advance their objectives. Unlike EU directives, country‐specific NEG prescriptions require neither the approval of the European Parliament nor their transposition into law, making it more difficult for social forces to contest them. Our analysis of NEG prescriptions for public utilities in two sectors (rail and water) and four countries (Germany, Ireland, Italy, Romania) across 10 years (2009–2019) shows that the shift to NEG provided EU executives with new extra‐parliamentarian and extra‐juridical tools that allowed them to revive their stalled commodification agenda; at the price of accentuating the EU's democratic and justice deficits.

GovernanceVol. 38(1)
University College Dublin (IE), Central European University (AT)
Irish Research eLibrary, University College Dublin
Openalex Percentile: Top 1%
EU Law and Policy Analysis
31.97
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.