Weapons of the Weak: Technological Change, Guerrilla Firepower, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes

What explains counterinsurgency outcomes? Existing scholarship points to characteristics and strategies of incumbents and insurgents but neglects the role of insurgents’ weapons. Some studies discuss the effects of the firepower of insurgents relative to incumbents. Focusing on relative firepower, however, is problematic given the asymmetric nature of guerrilla warfare, with insurgents eschewing decisive engagements where incumbents would bring to bear their material superiority. We turn the spotlight, instead, on guerrilla firepower, i.e., insurgents’ absolute ability to inflict casualties on incumbents using small arms in hit-and-run attacks. We argue that technological innovations dating to the mid-19th century sowed the seeds for cumulative increases in lethality of insurgents' small arms – the standard tools of guerrilla warfare – over the following 150 years, enhancing tactical effectiveness of hit-and-run attacks and thus insurgents’ prospects of strategic success. Statistical analysis of novel data on guerrilla firepower in counterinsurgency campaigns from 1800 to 2005 corroborates our argument.