Ujęcie intuicji w filozofii Mikołaja Łosskiego

The purpose of this article is to show the main assumptions of the notion of ‘intuition’ in the philosophy of Nikolai Lossky. The notion of intuition is examined on the basis of the Russian philosopher’s works, primarily The Fundamental Doctrines of Psychology from the Point of View of Voluntarism (1903), The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge (1906) and Sensuous, intellectual and mystical intuition (1938). The initial hypothesis is that the notion of intuition is the result of prior assumptions in a broader metaphysical scheme. Thus, it did not arise at all from epistemological detailed analyses of the process of cognition, but was derived as a consequence of other, more general metaphysical assumptions. This does not mean, however, that the author proposes to abandon the notion of intuition in general. Rather, he points out the paradoxical fact that in the concept of intuitionism, the notion of intuition plays a secondary role to such metaphysical assumptions as gnoseological co-ordination or the division of the world into self and non-self.