Both Generable and Alterable in Aristotle’s <b> <i>On Generation and Corruption</i> </b> I.1 &amp; I.4

Abstract In GC I.1 Aristotle criticizes the monists and pluralists for accepting positions that eliminate either generation or alteration, and in GC I.4 he defends the existence of both. Thus, he must believe that his account is immune to those objections he raises against his predecessors, but it is difficult to reconstruct these objections, and so difficult to discern how Aristotle distinguishes his own account from theirs. In this paper, I propose a new reconstruction of these objections, and I show how Aristotle’s own account is immune to them so reconstructed. On my interpretation, Aristotle argues that neither the monists nor the pluralists can explain the generation of a substance. The monists cannot explain how an ultimate subject of predication–one mark of substance–is generated. The pluralists cannot explain how a being that can alter–another mark of substance–is generated. I subsequently show how Aristotle’s own account in GC I.4 sufficiently diverges from his predecessors to allow something that is both generable and alterable.