Opportunities for U.S.–China nuclear tension-reduction

Abstract Intense current U.S.–China hostility and distrust undermines the national interests of both sides, increasing the risks of conflict and decreasing the prospects for mutually beneficial cooperation. Reducing tensions will require compromises by both China and the United States. It would be difficult to achieve real trust between the U.S. and Chinese governments—but the record of U.S.–Soviet and U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control suggests that nuclear arms restraints are possible even between countries that see each other as adversaries. If China continues its current nuclear buildup with no restraints and no indication of where it is headed, it will force the United States to assume the worst and respond accordingly, potentially provoking a major nuclear arms race. Such competition would undermine China’s national security and likely destroy prospects for negotiated arms control. While China understandably rejects the idea of treaties that would permanently lock it into nuclear inferiority, some forms of nuclear restraint would serve China’s national interests by limiting the dangers of such an arms competition and potentially limiting U.S. forces and actions that China considers threatening. The Chinese government should instruct its nuclear experts and American politics experts to work together to develop proposals that would serve China’s interest and have a realistic chance of being negotiated.