Assessment and economic regulation of transport infrastructures in the case of PPP and PFI

Papers based on systematic literature reviews demonstrate that the scientific literature on PFIs and PPPs have been captured by industrial economics and, more specifically, by the theoretical developments on the principal-agent relationship. We propose in this communication to explore another paradigm, that of identifying the foundations of the public economy that deserve to be revisited in cases of public-private partnership. To do this, we will deal with what we consider to be the main economic controls of a transport policy, which suggests five questions. The WACC being in principle higher in a PPP case, what are the implications for the level of subsidy? Since the WACC is higher in the case of PPP/PFI, under what conditions can this option be profitable for public finances? Is the optimal tariff that which optimizes the welfare function or that which optimizes the income of the private partner? Must the optimal ranking of various projects be based on the socio-economic rate of return (ERR), on the financial internal rate of return (IRR) or on another criterion? What happens to the value for money criterion in the case of the evaluation of a program of several projects?