BETWEEN WAR AND DIPLOMACY (1913–1923): GREEK MILITARY PEDAGOGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE GREEK ARMY FROM THE TREATY OF NEUILLY TO THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE

This manuscript examines Greece’s transformative journey from the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), highlighting the interplay of military pedagogy, the evolution of the Greek army, and the role of diplomacy. Following its significant territorial gains in the Balkan Wars, Greece sought to consolidate its position through diplomacy and later navigated the challenges of World War I, including the National Schism between Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine I. The Treaty of Neuilly (1919) and the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) marked the apex of Greece’s territorial ambitions, driven by Venizelos’s diplomatic acumen. However, the Asia Minor Campaign (1919–1922) exposed the limits of military overreach and internal division, culminating in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which redefined Greek sovereignty and population demographics. This study explores how military modernization, strategic leadership, and diplomatic resilience shaped Greece’s national trajectory, offering broader insights into state-building and regional influence in a volatile era.