Investment neutrality in resource rent taxation – revealed preferences of Norwegian oil & gas companies

This study revisits the academic disagreement on the impact of resource rent tax design on oil and gas companies. The disagreement relates to whether the petroleum special tax on the Norwegian Continental Shelf leads to under- or over-investments. Ideally, to ascertain the degree of investment distortion, one would need to conduct an empirical analysis of the private investment decision information of oil and gas companies that is not publicly available. In this study, using a recent major petroleum resource rent tax overhaul as a case study, we adopt an alternative approach and examine information from the industry conveyed by oil and gas companies through the consultation process. If the underinvestment hypothesis is true, then the company should favor a change to a cash flow tax. At the same time, the opposite is true for the hypothesis that the special tax results in overinvestments – companies should be unfavorable towards a tax change. Analyses of oil and gas companies’ responses support the hypothesis that the previous tax regime provided investment disincentives.

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Publication Details

Journal
Cogent Business & Management
Published
2025-01-09
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2025.2450288
Citations
3
Primary Topic
Global Energy and Sustainability Research
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.09
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article

Investment neutrality in resource rent taxation – revealed preferences of Norwegian oil & gas companies

Ragnar Tveterås, Atle Blomgren, Jülide Ceren Ahi, Bård Misund et al.
3 citations
Cogent Business & Management
Global Energy and Sustainability Research
1.09
article

Investment neutrality in resource rent taxation – revealed preferences of Norwegian oil & gas companies

Ragnar Tveterås, Atle Blomgren, Jülide Ceren Ahi, Bård Misund, Atle G. Guttormsen
article en
3 citations

Abstract

This study revisits the academic disagreement on the impact of resource rent tax design on oil and gas companies. The disagreement relates to whether the petroleum special tax on the Norwegian Continental Shelf leads to under- or over-investments. Ideally, to ascertain the degree of investment distortion, one would need to conduct an empirical analysis of the private investment decision information of oil and gas companies that is not publicly available. In this study, using a recent major petroleum resource rent tax overhaul as a case study, we adopt an alternative approach and examine information from the industry conveyed by oil and gas companies through the consultation process. If the underinvestment hypothesis is true, then the company should favor a change to a cash flow tax. At the same time, the opposite is true for the hypothesis that the special tax results in overinvestments – companies should be unfavorable towards a tax change. Analyses of oil and gas companies’ responses support the hypothesis that the previous tax regime provided investment disincentives.

Cogent Business & ManagementVol. 12(1)
NORCE Research AS (NO), Norwegian Veterinary Institute (NO), Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NO), University of Stavanger (NO)
Decent work and economic growth
Openalex Percentile: Top 26%
Global Energy and Sustainability Research
1.09
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Investment neutrality in resource rent taxation – revealed preferences of Norwegian oil & gas companies — Ragnar Tveterås, Atle Blomgren, et al. · Cogent Business & Management (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS