Hayek and Schmitt on the ‘depoliticization’ of the economy

Abstract Both Friedrich Hayek and Carl Schmitt criticize the role played by economic interest groups in modern democracies. This paper points out that their descriptions of how such groups attempt to obtain favourable treatment from the state (‘rent seeking’) are highly similar. The paper then discusses their proposed solutions. Schmitt’s solution, referred to as ‘depoliticization’, involves the establishment of an authoritarian state together with a corporatist economic system. Hayek, by contrast, argues in favour of constitutionally limiting the ability of politicians to grant privileges to economic groups. The paper further asks whether, as claimed in the literature, Hayek’s solution is similar to Schmitt’s in that both attempt to shield the free market economy from democratic oversight. It is reasoned that Hayek’s solution is not undemocratic (unless one defines democracy as pure majoritarianism), while Schmitt’s solution is not conducive to free markets.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Cambridge Journal of Economics
Published
2025-01-09
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/beae048
Primary Topic
Critical Theory and Philosophy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Hayek and Schmitt on the ‘depoliticization’ of the economy

Daniel Nientiedt
Cambridge Journal of Economics
Critical Theory and Philosophy
article

Hayek and Schmitt on the ‘depoliticization’ of the economy

Daniel Nientiedt
article en

Abstract

Abstract Both Friedrich Hayek and Carl Schmitt criticize the role played by economic interest groups in modern democracies. This paper points out that their descriptions of how such groups attempt to obtain favourable treatment from the state (‘rent seeking’) are highly similar. The paper then discusses their proposed solutions. Schmitt’s solution, referred to as ‘depoliticization’, involves the establishment of an authoritarian state together with a corporatist economic system. Hayek, by contrast, argues in favour of constitutionally limiting the ability of politicians to grant privileges to economic groups. The paper further asks whether, as claimed in the literature, Hayek’s solution is similar to Schmitt’s in that both attempt to shield the free market economy from democratic oversight. It is reasoned that Hayek’s solution is not undemocratic (unless one defines democracy as pure majoritarianism), while Schmitt’s solution is not conducive to free markets.

Cambridge Journal of EconomicsVol. 49(2)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 99%
Critical Theory and Philosophy
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