Adversarialism and power-sharing: the effect of political competition on the management-performance relationship

Abstract We analyze the moderating effect of political contexts on the management-performance relationship. Dissimilar party systems generate different patterns of political competition, such as adversarialism versus power-sharing. We argue adversarialism strengthens the effect of chief executives’ experience on government performance by offering more incentives for competition and accountability, compared to power-sharing systems. Although Colombian and Mexican subnational governments share several institutional similarities, Mexico exhibits more adversarial competition, compared to Colombia’s power-sharing tradition. Therefore, governors’ background experience should be more strongly associated with gubernatorial performance in Mexico than in Colombia. We built panel data sets for the 32 Mexican states and the 32 Colombian departamentos by collecting governors’ biographical information, regional characteristics, and performance indicators for education (high school enrollment) and health (infant mortality rate). Findings indicate governors’ experience enhances performance in Mexican states, but not in Colombian departamentos . These suggest political competition patterns condition the role of executive experience on performance.