Teaching Margaret Cavendish Through the Lens of Scientific Anti-Realism

Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673) only began receiving sustained attention by historians of philosophy in recent decades, but she is being rapidly integrated into the early modern philosophical canon. This essay explores one dimension of teaching Cavendish that presents difficulties for introductory philosophy students: her criticisms of experimental philosophy. Section one explains how I integrate Cavendish into the narrative of my course, identifying both historical and thematic strategies for including her in introductory philosophy courses. Section two describes methods for teaching Cavendish’s natural philosophy and identifies a pedagogical challenge to presenting her criticisms of experimental philosophy. In their first exposure to Cavendish, students may conclude that her writings are anti-scientific. Section three explains how I addressed this pedagogical challenge by restructuring my course narrative around Cavendish’s early poetry and recent debates concerning scientific realism. Ultimately, teaching Cavendish through the lens of scientific anti-realism makes it easier to integrate her writings into introductory philosophy courses while giving students tools for contextualizing her natural philosophy among historical and present-day scientific practices.