On the Importance of an Endogenous Ontological Account of Ancestors

Abstract This article critiques Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe’s “Ontology, Realism and the Persistence of Ancestral Persons” response to Katrina Flikschuh’s “The Arc of Personhood” argument on the theoretical grounding of ancestors in Ifeanyi Menkiti’s work. Flikschuh argues that ancestors are uncertain and redundant such that one can only account for them practically. Contrastingly, Oyowe defends Menkiti’s concept of ancestors as social kinds in his innovative attempt to theoretically ground them. The article argues that the dialogue between these thinkers reflects an exogenous reading of African experiential reality, effectively lending itself to epistemic erasure. In the end, the existence of ancestors is ambiguous at best in both their accounts. The article first questions Flikschuh’s view and suggests that it is paradigmatic of white solipsism. Thereafter, the article contends that while Oyowe’s social ontology injunction challenges Western realism, he fails to account for mind-independent ancestral persons. In the end, he only partially captures African experiential reality, thereby reflecting Western ways of being.