Razones, funciones y causas

The philosophical characterization of the explanation of behavior holds that two explanatory relations are central to its intelligibility: rationality and causality. In the present article, we will assess how fitting this characterization is regarding explanations of behaviors provided in contextual psychotherapies. Our assessment will yield negative answers in several respects. First, we will argue that, given that the goal of these therapies is not holistic understanding or normative assessment, rationality does not play a substantive role in its explanations of behavior. Second, causality is secondary in the diagnostic stage. We will argue that, at this point, the function of the problematic behaviors is what is trying to be understood. Third, causality does play a role in the intervention stage of the therapeutical process. However, we claim that this role is not the same as the folk model of philosophical characterization assumes. On a more positive note, we suggest that explanations of behavior in functional contextual therapy are hybrid, with functional explanations at the diagnostic stage and causal explanations at the intervention stage.