Exit from Regime Complexity? Regional International Organizations under Scrutiny

Abstract Regional regime complexity has long been on the rise and carries a series of potential negative effects, such as waste of resources or reduced effectiveness of regional governance. This article investigates a specific strategy of how states cope with regime complexity, namely by exiting regional international organizations (RIOs). We develop hypotheses on how different types of regional regime complexity influence the chances for exits to occur and theorize interaction effects. The analysis reveals that higher levels of membership- and competency-based regime complexity as well as RIO incompatibility increase the likelihood of state withdrawals. In addition, state characteristics moderate this effect and influence who leaves which organization. Most importantly, smaller rather are less able to shape RIO policies and activities and have fewer capacities to implement them and are thus more likely to exit one of the organizations when being member in many overlapping RIOs. By contrast, powerful states can better navigate regime complexity and avoid negative side-effects and are therefore less inclined to withdraw from RIOs in situations of high regional regime complexity.