Discussions on Ibn Sīnā’s Proof (Ishārah) That Existence Is Not Added to The Necessary: al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, And Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah

Later theologians and Peripatetic philosophers concur that existence is added to contingents. However, while philosophers assert that existence is not added to the Necessary, theologians dispute this judgment. According to the argument presented in the fourth namaṭ of Ibn Sīnā’s (d. 428/1037) al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, accepting essence as the cause of existence leads to certain issues. The most prominent of these is taqaddum, which is the precedence of something over itself. This study explores Ibn Sīnā’s argument, al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) objections in his Sharḥ, al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 672/1274) responses to these objections, and Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah’s (d. 747/1346) analysis of al-Ṭūsī’s responses. By focusing on these figures, we can understand how the acceptance of the concept of wujūd (existence), one of the concepts of al-umūr al-ʿāmmah (general concepts), influenced the course of the debate. Unlike the aforementioned scholars, Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah accepts that existence is shared in terms of expression and thus rejects both the distinction between existence and essence and the notion of accidentality. This study will first underscore the critical role of the distinction between existence and essence in the Peripatetic system. After elucidating the position of this distinction within the Peripatetic framework, I will delve into the proof of al-Ishārāt, the central focus of this study. This analysis will examine the approaches of al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, and Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah in terms of their comparative and interconnected perspectives on the proof. Notably, Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah’s approach, which has gained attention in modern scholarship for its methodological significance but has seen less focus on its theological implications, will be particularly emphasized.